This study presents theory that shows how increased competitive entry and decreased advantages of scale in an industry can benefit and entrench incumbent dominants, when important resources are scalable and widely-available. An initial test of the proposed theory using thirty years of data on competition among mutual funds supports the theory's predictions: While increased entrepreneurial entry reduced investment flows into incumbent funds on average, dominant mutual funds-those with orders of magnitude higher assets under management compared to competitors with similar portfolio holdings-benefited from increased competition. Heightened entrepreneurial entry increased flows into dominant funds and entrenched them in their dominant positions. The theory holds potential implications across a variety of industry and non-industry settings.
INTRODUCTION
The number of mutual funds offered in the United States increased almost 30-fold from 1976 to 2009, and the number of fund management companies more than quadrupled. Despite this influx of new competitors, Fidelity and Vanguard maintained dominant positions from the late 1970s onward, with each managing about 12% of the total net assets held in mutual funds as of 2009 (Khorana & Servaes, 2012) . Fidelity and Vanguard's entrenched dominance is far from the only instance of durable industry dominance. Budweiser beer, Wrigley gum, and Coca-Cola and Pepsi colas have all maintained dominance in their respective markets for decades. Beyond industry, the wealthy in the United States are also durably dominant. U.S. society as a whole has become more open over the past half-century, and many class-, ethnicity-, and gender-based barriers to entry into previously-exclusive cultural spheres and social organizations have been weakened (Peterson & Kern, 1996; Khan, 2011) . The elite as a class are also less cohesive than in previous decades (Mizruchi, 2013; Chu & Davis, 2013 ). Yet an increasing and very large proportion of resources in the United States is controlled by a small group of individuals, and entry into this elite group has become almost impossible for those not born elite (e.g., Kopczuk, Saez, & Song, 2010; Piketty & Saez, 2003 ). Today's top movie stars have also maintained their dominance over many years-even as the number of new actors earning their first roles increased dramatically.
Middle-aged men (Brad Pitt, then age 48; George Clooney, 50; Johnny Depp, 48) and women (Sandra Bullock, 47; Meryl Streep, 62) These examples are puzzling because dominance was durable, when we would expect it not to be.
Increased competition in mutual funds and beer, and for movie roles, should have eroded dominants' advantages. More open access and competitive parity in society should have led to more equality in wealth. This study proposes an explanation for how such durable dominance occurs. I present theory that predicts that dominants-those with vastly disproportionate control of contested resources-benefit from increased competitive entry into their markets and decreased advantages of scale, when resources are abundant and widely-available. An initial test of the theory, with data from the mutual fund industry, finds support for the theory's predictions.
The next section summarizes classical theories of dominant entrenchment-or sustained competitive advantage-and argues that we need to extend these theories to explain dominant entrenchment in current contexts. The subsequent section presents models of processes that lead to dominant entrenchment in open, competitively level, resource-abundant settings. These models show how increased entrepreneurial entry and competitive parity can benefit dominants and entrench dominant/non-dominant dichotomies. Durable dominance ensues when a highly-skewed distribution of resource levels is coupled with a less-skewed distribution of changes in resource levels. Results from an investigation of mutual funds' competition for investments are presented in the next section. While the vast majority of incumbent mutual funds were adversely affected by increased entrepreneurial entry, a few dominants benefited immensely. I conclude by summarizing contributions of this study to theory and implications for practice.
THE PARADOX OF DURABLE DOMINANCE
This study focuses on understanding the mechanisms underlying durable dominance. I define dominance as controlling a vastly disproportionate share of contested resources. For companies or their products, this means having an order of magnitude higher market share than the average competitor. For individuals in society, this means possessing a vastly disproportionate amount of wealth, power, fame, or career success. Ideas that attract a vastly disproportionate amount of attention and legitimacy are also dominant. Dominance is durable when it endures in the face of increased competitive entry and structural changes that level the playing field, attenuating the competitive advantages of scale 2 .
Dominant entrenchment in economics, strategy, and sociology
While scholars in the disciplines of economics, strategy, and sociology disagree on the desirability of dominant entrenchment-the continuous control of a vastly disproportionate share of contested resources by a fixed group of actors-there is broad theoretical agreement that increased numbers of competitors and more level (i.e., less scale-dependent) rules of competition make it harder for dominants to maintain their positions. Neoclassical economics asserted that competition optimizes social welfare, partially by preventing dominants from unduly maintaining their positions (Samuelson, 1947: Chapter 8) . Following this logic, structuralists (Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939; Hunt, 1972) maintained that barriers to industry entry and intra-industry mobility should be lowered to prevent monopolistic predation and oligopolistic collusion. Other economists (Stigler, 1968; Demsetz, 1973) argued instead that market dominance was often the result of firms' successful innovation. Dominants could only maintain their positions by continually out-innovating competitors-as long as resources could flow between industries and the "lure of profit induces entry" (Fisher, 1979: 675) . Some scholars asserted that even such innovation capability-based market dominance was inherently unstable against competitive pressures, with dominated industries providing fertile ground for "industrial mutation … that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one" (Schumpeter, [1942 (Schumpeter, [ ] 1994 .
Strategy scholars-for whom dominant entrenchment (i.e., sustained competitive advantage) is, in some respects, the Holy Grail-have built on these economic theories. Firms were advised to enter industries with high barriers to entry and to erect such barriers in their own industries (Porter, 1980) , and to build distinctive capabilities. The resource-based view (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) deemed sustained competitive advantage possible only if dominants controlled unique resources-"assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc." (Barney, 1991: 101) -that allowed them to execute their chosen strategies profitably, whereas other firms lacking these resources could not profit from the same strategies. Other theories argued that resource-based dominance was not durable, however. Challengers developing disruptive innovations-technologies that initially only address niche needs, but over time evolve to cost-effectively address the needs of the mass market-could nullify dominants' resource advantages and usurp their positions (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997) . A sociologically-inspired line of reasoning suggested, furthermore, that the presence of one or more dominant firms in an industry fostered an abundance of small, niche-oriented competitors. This process of resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985) would create fertile conditions for the development of disruptive innovations.
Unlike strategy scholars, sociologists typically viewed elite entrenchment and durable inequality as moral ills to be diagnosed and cured, and focused on understanding individual, family, or class dominance in society. Early scholarship deemed the existence and domination of elites inevitable (Michels, [1911 (Michels, [ ] 1962 Mosca, [1896 Mosca, [ ] 1939 , arguing that the challenges of organizing large groups invariably led to small cadres of well-coordinated governing elites. Indeed, a large number of social institutions-e.g., kinship ties, shared organizations, and business relationships-supporting cohesion and coordination among elites were identified during the twentieth century (Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1967; 1970; Miliband, 1969; Useem, 1984; Mizruchi, 1992) . Elites also distinguished themselves from non-elites by monopolizing certain types of resources-"economic, social, cultural, political, or knowledge capital" (Khan, 2012: 361; see also Tilly, 1998 , on opportunity hoarding). U.S. elites during the Gilded Age sought to set themselves apart culturally by excluding non-elites from highbrow art and music, for example (Levine, 1990) . Habits, tastes, and dispositions acquired at an early age helped elites succeed later in life (Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985; Lamont, 1992) .
In sum, while scholars of economics, strategy, and sociology often disagreed on the value of dominant entrenchment and were focused on different units of analysis, they agreed that exclusion, collusion, and monopolization supported dominant entrenchment. High barriers to entry, whether into industries or social groups, preserved existing positions. Dominants, often collectively, used their disproportionate resources to maintain their advantages. Companies colluded in predatory pricing to bankrupt smaller competitors. Elite individuals instinctively preferred to help others from similar privileged backgrounds. Dominant companies and individuals alike banded together to collectively influence policy. Dominants attempted to monopolize valuable resources to keep them "rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable" (Barney, 1991: 116) , and thus separate themselves from the non-dominant. of "a thousand flowers" (Pfeffer, 1995) as the number of business authors, journals, theories, and articles increased dramatically, yet "we have become stuck in theories developed in the latter half of the twentieth century" (Schoonhoven, Meyer, & Walsh, 2005: 327) . The apparent disappearance of a cohesive, distinct elite (Mizruchi, 2013; Chu & Davis, 2013) suggests that elites and privilege matter less in the U.S., and social elites are no longer distinguishable by their monopolization of highbrow culture (Peterson & Kern, 1996; Khan, 2011 ). Yet over the past forty years, economic mobility in the United States has declined (Kopczuk, Saez, & Song, 2010) , while the wealth gap between elite and non-elite has dramatically increased (Piketty & Saez, 2003 
PROCESSES OF DURABLE DOMINANCE
This section starts by describing a stylized ecological model of resource-based market competition. I model resource distributions and trajectories in an industry characterized by two conditions: 1) The industry is closed to new entry and exit. 2) Companies with higher revenues can invest more in building future resources than competitors with lower revenues. I then examine the consequences of relaxing each of these conditions in turn-i.e., opening the market, and increasing competitive parity-and show that either of these changes can benefit dominants and lead to durable dominance. Based on the model, I suggest a typology of processes that foster durable dominance and boundary conditions for the processes' operation. I conclude the section by summarizing the theoretical predictions suggested by the model, and comparing these predictions to those of strategy theories of firm heterogeneity.
Classical dominant entrenchment
Consider an industry, closed to new entry and exit, where companies with higher revenues can invest more than those with lower revenues into building resources-capabilities, attributes, and holdings that contribute to firm performance. Firms with higher levels of resources will have higher revenue. Also assume strong resource-based barriers to intra-industry mobility; firms which have previously done well are expected to continue doing well. We can model these conditions by assuming that the magnitude of change in revenue during each time period is stochastic and proportional to the firm's current revenue-i.e., a rich-get-richer Matthew effect (Merton, 1968) holds. Formally:
where a firm f has revenue R at time t, and n is a random value drawn for each firm and time step from a normal distribution with non-negative mean m and standard deviation σ. This equation approximates a random walk on a logarithmic scale, which after a sufficient number of time periods results in a highly-skewed, log-normal distribution of revenues across firms (cf. Gibrat, 1931) . Such a distribution is commonly observed in real industries (Schmalensee, 1989: 994) . 
Change in resource distributions
Dominants may become entrenched, however, if a large number of new entrants enter the market. Figure 1A presents stylized revenue distributions in an industry before competitive entry. The distribution of revenue levels is highly-skewed, approximating a power law distribution. If we assume that firms compete primarily against those with similar revenues (as strategic group theory [Caves & Porter, 1977] predicts), firms with larger revenues will have fewer direct competitors. A firm with $100 million in revenue may compete against only ten direct competitors, while a firm with $10 million in revenue competes against 100 similar companies.
This reasoning implies that the revenue distribution curve equates to a competitive intensity curve. Figure 1B shows revenue distributions-the competitive intensity curve-after massive industry entry. Entering firms rarely enter with resources of the level of dominants, since dominant firms have resources that are of the order of magnitude of the total resources in the industry. Entrants often enter with resources greater than the median incumbent firm, however, since entry is endogenous-a firm will not enter the market unless its management believes that the firm possesses, or can quickly build, a competitive level of resources.
After mass entry, the competitive intensity curve flattens up to a revenue threshold corresponding to the thinning of the right tail of the new entrant revenue curve (see Figure 1B ).
Incumbents with revenue above this threshold do not experience noticeable changes in the number of similar-size competitors. Firms slightly below the threshold, on the other hand, experience a multiple order of magnitude explosion in the number of their direct competitors.
These unfortunate incumbents are forced to devote more of their resources to competition against similar competitors, and have less slack left to challenge larger incumbents. To the extent that incumbent near-dominants must divert resources to defend against new entrants' advances, incumbents above the threshold-durable dominants-face less threat from competition below and become entrenched in their dominant positions.
Incumbents just below the threshold also suffer from a dilution of consumer attention. Consider an industry with one dominant firm and ten near-dominant firms. Consumers may attempt to compare the offerings from each of these eleven firms when making a purchase decision. A lucky or good near-dominant may gain business and successfully challenge the dominant and take over its position. Successful challenges become unlikely if mass entry of new competitors creates 90 more near-dominant firms, however. Search costs will preclude consumers from carefully comparing offerings from the 101 dominant and near-dominant firms. A near-dominant firm attempting to overtake the dominant will find it harder to distinguish itself from other near-dominants, while the dominant firm will strengthen its consumer recognition and distinctiveness.
-
Note that entrants in this model need not be newly-established firms, but can be established firms entering new (to them) industries. A special case worth considering is the effect of market mergers from processes of industry convergence (when companies from multiple industries come to compete in the same product market) or globalization (when companies from different geographical markets come to compete in a single world-wide market). If pre-convergence or pre-globalization resource distributions are highly-skewed within each market, and the size distribution of the pre-merger markets is also highly-skewed, then the post-market merger resource distribution will have a shape similar to the distribution predicted after mass entry ( Figure 1B ). Near-dominant firms in the post-merger market will face sharply increased competition, benefiting the dominant firm from the largest pre-merger market. This largest dominant will enjoy entrenched dominance in the newly merged market.
Change in resource trajectories
Dominants also become entrenched if the playing field in the competition for revenue growth is "leveled" by making increases in revenues independent of existing revenue size-i.e., eliminating the Matthew effect so the poor can gain or lose as much wealth in each time step as the rich. If Bill Gates was constrained to gain or lose $1,000 a day, his position atop the wealth distribution would be frozen in place. Even if he lost $1,000 every day for 50 years, he would lose less than $20 million of his $70 billion 3 fortune. Conversely, a penniless graduate student gaining $1,000 every day over the same period could amass less than $20 million-a large sum to the student but much below Gates's wealth 4 . Leveling the playing field leads to entrenched dominants. Dominants' levels of contested resources never diminish to non-dominant levels, and non-dominants can never become dominant.
Formally, when resource level changes become additive where they were previously multiplicative: Indeed, the introduction of this rule would cement Gates's position atop the list of the world's richest people, protecting him from being overtaken even by those such as Carlos Slim, whose net worth Forbes estimates at $69.86 billion. Note that the graduate student could catch up to Gates's wealth if the daily flat bet was of an order of magnitude similar to Gates's wealth. This scenario-equivalent to debasing U.S. currency so that $100 million is a reasonable day's wages-is unlikely, however. the probability of dominant displacement effectively vanishes across wide ranges of values for average change in resource level m 2 and standard deviation σ 2 .
Conditions of durable dominance
In the models described above, the introduction of more open and level competition has differential effects on dominants and non-dominants. In fields where previous conditions allowed dominants to emerge (i.e., a small group of firms amassed disproportionate resources orders of magnitude higher than the average firm), mass entrepreneurial entry and increased competitive parity entrench dominant positions. It is worthwhile to consider the general principle behind these results: Durable dominance occurs when the distribution of contested resources is highly-skewed, and the distribution of changes in contested resource levels for non-dominants is less-skewed. Then non-dominants with levels of contested resources an order of magnitude below dominants' levels cannot accrue resources of the order of magnitude necessary to overtake dominants.
The distribution of changes in resource levels for non-dominants can become less-skewed through two types of processes. The first type of process affects the dynamics of resource accumulation indirectly by changing the competitive intensity curve. Such distribution changes may stem from increased de novo entry into the industry, or processes of industry convergence and globalization. The second type of process entails a direct change in the dynamics of resource accumulation-e.g., weakening of rich-get-richer effects.
The reasoning above rests upon three assumptions about the nature of resources, and the effects of the proposed mechanisms will be stronger to the degree these assumptions are met in a given setting: 1) Resources and revenue are abundant and scalable-that is, levels of resources and revenue can differ between firms by many orders of magnitude. 2) All actors share and have access to the same types of resources; no actor holds a proprietary resource that locks out competitors. 3) Only aggregate resource levels matter in determining an actor's success; there are no resources that are crucial, and no resource combinations which are more potent than others.
This last assumption is equivalent to assuming that all resources are equally transposable to each other. Note that all three assumptions are satisfied if we assume that all needed resources can be bought and sold easily-that is, factor markets are efficient (cf. Barney, 1986) . Money is inherently scalable and widely-held. If it can be used to buy all needed resources, then aggregate levels of cash become the key to determining success. Development of technologies of outsourcing, distributed contract manufacturing, and network organization strengthens the effects of the proposed mechanisms.
Beyond these assumptions, the model imposes few constraints on the types and characteristics of actors, resources, outcomes, and competition. Dominants need not engage in agentic anti-competitive action, such as predatory pricing, collusion, or political influence to maintain dominance. Indeed, dominants need not to be capable of action at all. Popular ideas may become durably dominant if the number of competing ideas increases rapidly, for example. The theory developed above should apply across a variety of settings.
Distinct theoretical predictions
The reasoning above predicts distinctive non-linear effects of increased competition. Increased competition will reduce flows of contested resources to non-dominant incumbents. Increased influx of new entrants will increase the flow of contested resources to dominants compared to non-dominants, however, and lengthen the expected reign of dominants. Increased competitive parity between actors with disparate levels of contested resources will have the same effects.
These outcomes arise because of the differential effect of increased competition on near-dominants compared to dominants. Increased competitive entry disproportionately increases competitive intensity for near-dominants compared to dominants. Decreased advantages of scale weaken near-dominants' ability to cross the gap separating them from dominants. The benefits to dominants of increased competition are greater in settings where key resources are abundant and widely-available. These conditions make it harder for near-dominants to defend their positions against new competitors and prevent near-dominants from building unique, inimitable, and valuable capabilities that can be leveraged to challenge dominants.
These predictions are quite different from-often opposite to-the predictions of established theories of sustained competitive advantage. To my knowledge, none of the major theories of heterogeneity in firm performance predict a nonlinear effect of increased competition that benefits only the few dominants in an industry. On the other hand, almost all theories of firm heterogeneity assume some mechanism of exclusion, whereby dominants monopolize access to resources.
Strategy scholars typically classify sources of firms' performance advantage (most often profit, but sometimes revenue or market share) as stemming from either privileged market positions or unique resources (e.g., Cool, Costa, and Dierickx, 2002) . Privileged market positions allow dominants to protect their position through strategic commitments or network externalities.
Strategic commitments (or sunk costs; Sutton, 1991) by dominants in building resources such as brand recognition or production capacity can entrench dominants by removing the incentive for challengers to similarly invest in increased scale or scope, if the anticipated cost for a challenger to build scale-efficient resources is larger than the anticipated benefit. Expected benefits are smaller for challengers than for dominants who have already built up their resources, because challengers who invest must compete for market share with dominants who have already invested. The proposed theory complicates the picture, predicting that dominant entrenchment will be strengthened by increased entrepreneurial entry. As consumer demand is further divided among incumbent and new firms, non-dominant incumbents' potential benefits from resource investments decrease, weakening their incentives to grow larger.
Network externalities (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1992) are also portrayed as locking in dominant advantage, by increasing value and switching costs for consumers and suppliers. The classic network strategy is to exclude the strongest competitors from your own platform, while increasing the number of other parties who use your platform. The proposed theory suggests that a better way for the strongest firm to maintain dominance would be to invite all competitors to compete on the same network platform, and to support the smallest competitors so that they grow to compete against and weaken larger competitors. Sharing the same resources (such as the network platform) is better for maintaining dominance than allowing competing-and possibly disruptive-sets of resources to be developed.
This last observation drives home the boundary between the proposed theory and theories of unique resource-based heterogeneity (Barney, 1991) and disruptive innovation (Schumpeter [1942 (Schumpeter [ ] 1994 Christensen, 1997) . Unique resource-based competitive advantage requires that resources be imperfectly mobile and imperfectly imitable. Dominants can protect their resource advantages through rich-get-richer economies of resource accumulation (either mass efficiencies or connectedness of asset stocks; Dierickx and Cool, 1989 ) and barriers to imitation (time compression diseconomies, causal ambiguity [Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990 ], or exclusivity). The resource-based view does not satisfactorily explain sustained heterogeneity in settings where rich-get-richer resource dynamics are absent, and resources are abundant and widely-available, however. In such settings, theory such as that presented in the current paper is needed to explain durable dominance.
Like the resource-based view, Christensen's (1997) theory of disruptive innovation assumes that dominants control resources different from those of non-dominants. Non-dominant, niche players who lack the technology to successfully address the mainstream market use their inferior but cheaper technologies to meet niche market needs. Over time, some of these originally-inferior technologies evolve enough that they can address mainstream market needs at low cost.
Challengers who control these new mainstream-capable technologies displace incumbent dominants. The existence of proprietary, non-shared resources is essential for this narrative of disruptive innovation; the reasoning suggests that disruptive innovation will be unlikely in industries where key resources are abundant and widely-available. In such settings, the dearth of disruptive innovation will increase the duration of durable dominance.
The proposed theory will apply to an increasing number of settings in a world where resources are becoming abundant and widely-available. One factor driving this resource trend is the increased availability of outsourced services. In durable product markets, for example, the rise of contract manufacturing services has eliminated the need for upfront investment in dedicated production capacity. You no longer need to own a factory to produce goods, and you can often scale production from single-unit prototypes to millions of units easily with the help of offshore OEM manufacturers. Marketing, sales, and distribution are even easier to scale using Internet-based services.
It is important to understand how industry dynamics are affected by this trend towards financialization of key industry resources. What happens when money, which is inherently abundant (i.e., a large total amount exists) and widely-available (almost everyone can have some money), can efficiently purchase all the necessary expertise and resources for firm success? To answer this question, it is instructive to study industries where competitive dynamics have historically centered around abundant and widely-available resources. Below, I present a first test of the proposed theory in a setting where money itself-in the form of consumer investments-was (and is) the contested resource.
DURABLE DOMINANCE IN THE U.S. MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY, 1980-2010
As a first empirical test of the theory, I examine the competitive dynamics of open-ended U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2010. Mutual funds compete against each other to secure investor assets to manage. This market was competitive in recent years; increased competitive entry decreased incumbents' future flows of assets under management (Wahal & Wang, 2011) . The proposed theory predicts that these competitive effects should be non-linear, with flows into dominants behaving differently from flows into non-dominants. Hypothesis 1. Increased entry will increase flows of assets into dominant funds compared to flows into non-dominant incumbent funds.
Flows of assets into non-dominant funds should decrease when new entry increases. On the other hand, flows into dominant funds increase, as dominant funds face weakened competition from near-dominants. This strengthened position will also lead to dominant funds remaining dominant longer.
Hypothesis 2. Increased entry will increase the probability of dominant funds remaining dominant for longer time periods.
The mutual fund setting is well-suited for the current inquiry in three ways. First, this setting appears to be characterized by durable dominance. Dominant companies maintained their position in the face of mass influx of new competitors. Barriers to entry were low, contested resources were scalable, and the resources needed to operate a fund were widely-available. This setting thus provides a testbed to examine whether dominant entrenchment can be explained by the proposed theory's predictions of non-linear effects of increased competitive entry 5 . Second, data are available for the whole population without survivor bias for a suitably long period.
Finally, the setting is substantively important. Mutual funds have grown to occupy a central part in the U.S. economy during the period under study.
The development of the mutual fund industry
As of 2009, $11.1 trillion was invested in mutual funds. This figure corresponded to more than one fifth of total U.S. household net worth, which stood at $54.2 trillion. Mutual funds were not always so consequential, however. Mutual funds managed only $51 billion in 1976, less than 1% of the total U.S. household net worth of $5.8 trillion 6 .
The tremendous growth (17.72% CAGR during the 33 years from 1976 to 2009) in mutual funds' assets under management was driven by several factors. The 1980s and 1990s were bull markets for both stocks and bonds, making them attractive alternatives to traditional bank offerings. 5 Other studies in my dissertation also examine settings where entrenched dominance is observed in the face of increased competitive entry or decreased scale advantages. The goal of these studies is to establish the non-linear effects of increased competition on dominants versus non-dominants, and explore the micro-mechanisms underlying the effects. Future studies will examine contexts with less observed dominant entrenchment and lower levels of resource abundance and wide availability to test the effect of changed boundary conditions. Despite the influx of new competitors and innovations, the top management companies maintained market dominance. Fidelity and Vanguard increased their market shares from 6% and 3.6% respectively in 1976 to about 12% each in 2009 (Khorana & Servaes, 2012) . Such continued dominance may suggest that the market for investors' assets was not competitive-perhaps because of "stickiness" of already-invested funds. Prominent critics (Bogle, 2003; Swensen, 2005; Spitzer, 2004; Freeman & Brown, 2001 ) argued that mutual funds did not compete in a competitive market. Others (e.g., Coates & Hubbard, 2007; Wahal and Wang, 2011; Khorana and Servaes, 2012) responded, however, with economic arguments and empirical evidence suggesting that the mutual fund market was indeed a competitive market. Wahal and
Wang's (2011) study was particularly suasive. They developed a portfolio-overlap measure of competitive intensity between incumbents and new entrants, and found that, after 1998,
ncumbents that have a high overlap with entrants subsequently … experience quantity competition through lower investor flows, have lower alphas, and higher attrition rates" (Wahal & Wang, 2011: 40) . Table 1 for specifics of these constructs.)
Data and variables

----------------------------------------------------Table 1 ----------------------------------------------------
Analysis and results
The first step in the analysis was to substantively replicate Wahal and Wang's (2011) Table 2 9 . As predicted by the proposed theory, the coefficient of the interaction term was significant and positive. Expected asset flow over the next 12 months decreased by $3.8 million for each unit increase in new entrant overlap for non-dominant funds.
Dominant funds, on the other hand, benefited from increased competitive entry. Expected asset 9 Including the lagged dependent variable on the right side of the fixed effect panel regression equation can lead to inconsistent and biased results. These errors should not substantively affect the reported results, however, given the current study's observed levels of residual autocorrelation and the large number of time periods. Additionally, estimates of the effects of non-lagged dependent variables will be biased downwards (Keele and Kelly, 2006) , so the reported significant effects are, if anything, under-estimated. In any case, alternative analyses using Arellano-Bond difference and system GMMs also supported the hypothesis.
flow into dominant funds increased by $70 million for each unit increase in new entrant overlap.
----------------------------------------------------Table 2 ----------------------------------------------------
To further check that the effect of new entrant overlap was indeed non-linear and not just a linear interaction effect with the size ratio, I examined the effects of increased new competitive entry at various levels of the size ratio. I created z-scores for the size ratio across each time period, then binned the observations using this z-score as shown in Table 3 . I created dummy variables (bin 1, bin 2, …, bin 11) for each bin, and re-ran the regression using (bin 1, bin 2, …, bin 11) and (bin 1, bin 2, …, bin 11) x (new entrant overlap) instead of dominant fund and (dominant fund) x (new entrant overlap). Figure 2 and Model 2 in Table 2 show the results from this regression. The difference in the coefficient for (bin 10) x (new entrant overlap) and (bin 11) x (new entrant overlap) compared to the other interaction terms is striking. Non-dominants-about 96.5% of observations-lost assets when similar new competitors entered the market, but dominants-approximately the top 3.5%-gained tremendously from new competitive entry.
----------------------------------------------------Table 3 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 2 ----------------------------------------------------
I next examined the effects of new entry on dominants' (and non-dominants') chances of maintaining (attaining) dominance in later years to test Hypothesis 2. Table 4 shows the results of these regressions. Dominant funds' chances of staying dominant three or five years later were positively influenced by increases in new entrant overlap, as predicted by the theory. New entrant overlap had no impact on the chances of becoming dominant for non-dominant funds. While the focal fund's size ratio significantly predicted the probability of being dominant up to five years into the future, currently being dominant was only consequential in determining whether the fund was dominant the following year.
These results support the predictions of the proposed theory. Increased entry of similar funds decreased non-dominant incumbents' future flows of assets, but increased dominants' future flows.
Increased competitive entry also increased the probability of dominant funds maintaining dominance for three or more years. On the other hand, in the absence of new competitive entry, a fund's current dominance significantly predicted continued dominance only in the following year.
In sum, increased entry disadvantaged non-dominant incumbents, but benefited and entrenched dominants.
Robustness checks
A series of robustness checks (some already done, others in progress) provide additional support for these results. The effects described above are robust to defining competitors in different ways.
Exploratory regressions using CRSP segment codes instead of overlap measures yielded substantially similar results to those seen in Model 2. CRSP segment codes are used inconsistently over the years, however, and so I am currently coding social network community detection algorithms to divide funds into communities. Funds will be considered linked if their cosine similarity is greater than zero, and the strength of the link defined as the cosine similarity between the funds. The size ratio is redefined as the ratio of the focal fund's total net assets to the average of all other funds in the community, and I will repeat the regressions using this alternate measure.
Using different definitions of new entry does not substantively change the results. The definition above counts a fund as a new entrant only if it is a newly-formed fund. An existing fund may also come into competition with a focal fund when either fund changes its portfolio composition to be more similar to the other. To examine effects of overall competition increase, I replaced new entrant overlap with change in competitive overlap in the regression models. Competitive overlap is calculated for each fund at each time period as the sum of pair-wise cosine similarities for the focal fund across all other funds existing in the time period (and not just new entrants).
Change in competitive overlap is the net difference between the current value of competitive overlap and the value 12 months prior.
Regressions using data from 1980 to 1998 yielded the same substantive results for the independent variables of interest. This is in contrast to Wahal and Wang's (2011) findings, which showed no effects of competitive entry on incumbent fund flows before 1998. One possible reason for their null result is that they were averaging across dominants and non-dominants. The mutual fund industry grew tremendously from 1980 to 1998. The large number of new entrants may have resulted (by the mechanisms proposed in this paper) in greatly increased flow to dominants that offset any decrease in flows to non-dominants, resulting in an average effect that was not significant. Another possible reason for their null result is that they did not control for total flows into similar funds. A rising tide may have lifted all boats.
An additional set of regressions tests a hypothesis about the mechanism underlying the observed main effects:
Hypothesis 3. The effects of new competitive entry on incumbent flows will be mediated by shifts in the competitive intensity curve, wherein increased new entrant overlap will lead to a reverse-U shaped increase in the number of similar competitors.
The highest and lowest size ratio funds are predicted to have lower increases in the number of similar competitors compared to the middle-size ratio funds. I will examine the competitive intensity curve, and conduct a mediation analysis to see if change in the competitive intensity curve explains the non-linear relationship between new entrant overlap and future fund flows.
A final set of alternate regressions will attempt to rule out several possible sources of endogeneity 10 . One possible alternative explanation for the observed results is that the success of dominants triggered new entry. Another is that a third factor influenced both new entry in the current year and disproportionate dominant growth in the following. For example, entrepreneurs may have recognized that a particular segment was set to grow the next year and founded many new funds in the segment, but dominants may have benefited disproportionately from increased investment influx because of their previous investments in scale 11 . As a first test, I will regress new entrant overlap in the next year against dominants' flow of assets previous twelve months to see if the first alternative explanation holds water. To better rule out more of both types of alternative explanations, I will use an instrumental variables approach. The number of new entrants should be correlated with barriers to entry and expected gains from entry. To proxy the size of barriers and short-term gains from entry, I use average expense fees (expense ratio times total net assets) accrued during the first three years of fund existence for similar new funds as my instrument. This measure should not be directly correlated with established fund growth.
Last but not least, I will try to understand the processes underlying the observed regression results through descriptive explorations of the data. These explorations will look at distributions and trajectories. I will attempt to confirm that the size distribution of funds within segments is highly-skewed, and look at how this distribution evolves over time. I will also examine the distribution of changes in size within segments. This distribution is expected to become less-skewed compared to the size distribution as more new entrants enter the segment.
I will also visually inspect the dynamics of mutual funds and segments, using 2-dimensional representations of the mutual fund market. The cosine similarity matrices can be processed with multi-dimensional scaling techniques or network layout algorithms to create a 2-dimensional plot of the mutual fund market, with similar funds clustered together (see Appendix 1). This allows a visual representation of the industry, which can be overlaid with information on community structure, fund size and dominance. A longitudinal series of maps shows the evolution of segments and the rise, fall, or continued dominance of funds within segments.
DISCUSSION
Economics, strategy, and sociology have been tremendously successful at generating theories explaining dominant entrenchment based on exclusion, collusion, and monopolization. This study is a first attempt at developing and validating theory that explains durable dominance-dominant entrenchment in the face of mass entrepreneurial entry and decreased advantages of scale in settings where resources are abundant and widely-available. The proposed theory suggests that dominants can maintain distinction-competitive advantage-in a world with no distinctive, monopolizable resources. Durable dominants distinguish themselves by magnitude rather than exclusivity; more of each resource, not different resources. Elite prep school students, for example, no longer pride themselves on their access to highbrow culture, but rather on being able to enjoy a large range of cultural experiences, the scope of which those from less privileged backgrounds find difficult to emulate (Khan, 2011 ). An order of magnitude difference in resources can lead to qualitative differences in capabilities. Those earning $4 million a year travel in private jets, those earning $400,000 in business class, and $40,000 earners in coach.
Easy transposibility and mobility of resources may act to entrench magnitude-based distinction.
Wealth, which is highly scalable, is also increasingly transposable. For individuals, wealth can buy the "right" type of cultural distinction, which can then be transposed into lucrative careers (Rivera, 2012) . Companies, too, can transpose wealth into and from other needed resources.
High status law firms generate increased profits by attracting partners from lower-status but high profit firms. Conversely, lower status but high profit firms purchase status by hiring partners from high status firms with lower profits (Rider & Tan, 2012 This line of thought forces a shift in how we think about dominant entrenchment. Rather than considering dominant tactics of exclusion, collusion, and monopolization, we need to consider the ecological distribution of resources among competitors and the trajectories of these resource distributions. The proposed theory predicts that durable dominance is contingent on order of magnitude differences between dominants' and non-dominants levels of contested resources.
Given such a highly-skewed distribution of resources, if the non-dominant have no way of accumulating resources an order of magnitude greater than what they currently possess, they cannot become dominant-and durable dominance occurs.
Analyzing highly-skewed distributions requires separating the analysis of dominants from that of non-dominants. The "1%" are different from the rest, but averaging or taking the median over the population obfuscates these differences. Gathering data on dominants often presents an empirical difficulty, however. Data on the richest Americans, for example, are rarely available in general social surveys. Nonetheless, this study-along with the related studies in my dissertation-shows that gathering and analyzing data on highly-skewed distributions is possible, and necessary to understand durable dominance.
The policy implications of the proposed theory are straightforward but counterintuitive.
Dominants may benefit from a strategy of opening their markets to new entrants and fostering small competitors. These upstarts will weaken potential challenges to the dominants' dominance from large but non-dominant incumbents. Whether guided by altruism or cunning, this seems precisely the strategy that Google, for example, is executing when it routinely provides funding, 
The actual stock space is high-dimensional, with as many dimensions as distinct domestic stocks held by mutual funds. Multi-dimensional scaling or network layout techniques allow us to project this space onto a 2-or 3-dimensional map. The nodes in this map are mutual funds, and similar (in portfolio composition) mutual funds will be clustered together in the map. This map can then be used to explore the structure of the mutual fund market and its evolution over time ( Figure A2 ).
The models proposed in this paper suggest that the identity of dominants will sometimes change when the number of funds in a segment is still small, but that the dominant fund at the time of an explosion in the number of funds in the segment will remain dominant for a long time thereafter. This intuition can be explored visually, as in Figure A2A .
The cosine similarity measure may be useful for other research studies. The mutual fund similarity and mapping data is of obvious interest to scholars interested in the industry evolution of mutual funds. The data can show the creation and growth of new fund types, movement of groups of funds in stock space, and movement of funds between groups (see Figure A2B) . The dataset may also be of use to researchers studying categories and network communities. The net flow of investments into the focal fund over the next 12 months, calculated as the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends and asset influx from mergers (cf. Sirri and Tufano, 1998) . Flows for four quarters were summed to create twelve month trailing measures.
Dominant in year+ n
A dichotomous variable that equals 1 if Dominant fund in year+n, where n = 1, 2, 4, 5. See below for definition of Dominant fund.
Flow of assets previous 12 months
The net flow of investments into the focal fund over the previous 12 months. See Flow of assets next 12 months above for measure details.
Flow of assets into similar funds
Cosine similarity-weighted average of flows into similar funds. Flow into the focal fund is included in the sum.
Standardized return
The focal fund's z-score (across all funds present in each time period) of 12-month fund returns from CRSP.
Standard deviation of returns
The standard deviation of the focal fund's past 12 months' monthly returns from CRSP.
Logged total net assets
The base 10 log of the total net assets of the fund from CRSP.
Logged age
The base 10 log of the age of the fund in months from CRSP.
Expense ratio The fund's expense ratio from CRSP.
Turnover ratio The fund's turnover ratio from CRSP.
Logged management company size
The base 10 log of the total net assets of the fund's management company. The management company code from the Thomson database was used to determine a fund's management company.
New entrant overlap The sum of pair-wise cosine similarities for the focal fund across all new entrants.
Size ratio
The ratio of the focal fund's total net assets to the cosine similarity-weighted average of its competitors' total net assets.
Dominant fund
A dichotomous variable that equals 1 when the focal fund's size ratio is greater than ten. Dominant fund = 1 for 1,212 observations (1.04% of total observations). Seventy-six funds are dominant in one or more time periods. I also use the z-score of the size ratio across contemporary funds as an alternate measure of dominance. 
